SKI INC. - Book Review
I have to catch up to Chris Diamond. Having read, SKI INC.: My Journey Through Four Decades in the Ski-Resort Business, from the Founding Entrepreneurs to Mega-Companies, in 2017, he has already followed it up with a deeper look at the ski industry.
Diamond is a resort consultant and veteran resort operator (Killington, Mount Snow, S-K-I Ltd., Steamboat Ski Resort). In 2019, he came out with his followup, Ski Inc. 2020: Alterra Counters Vail Resorts; Mega-Passes Transform the Landscape; the Industry Responds and Flourishes. Someone has to tell Chris his titles are long! Regardless, I will pick up his latest to get his take on what I call, the Coke v. Pepsi battle in skiing. Here is my review of his first effort. I am happy to see it holds up well and predicted key industry moves.
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Skiing is an old endeavor. Archeologists have dug up skis dating back 10,000 years in what is now China. The ski industry is much younger but has its own fascinating history. Forty-four of those years are captured in the book, Ski Inc. It is both fond reminiscence and cautionary tale from Chris Diamond who started out as a junior marketer and ended his career as Chief Operations Officer of the Steamboat Ski & Resort Corporation.
He was a fresh-faced convert to the sport though armed with two English degrees and service in Vietnam. Chris mentions that the American ski industry would not be what it is today if not for veterans of the 10th Mountain Division. They came back from World War Two and drove the development of skiing as a vacation industry and major sport.
Ex-soldiers laid out ski hills, designed ski lifts, became ski coaches, racers, instructors, patrollers, shop owners, and filmmakers. They wrote and published ski magazines, opened ski schools, improved ski equipment, and developed ski resorts. Up to 2,000 of the division's troops were involved in skiing-related professions after the war. At least 60 ski resorts were founded by men these men. But I digress.
Back to Chris’ book. I must be candid and say that the first third almost prompted me to give up. It was like attending someone’s retirement dinner and the speeches go on and on. I mean no disrespect to his accomplishments but the content would be hard pressed to interest even those most passionate about ski area management.
I stuck with it and was rewarded. It started cooking when he got to the rise of big ski corporations. The coverage of Intrawest was especially engaging. I am bit biased given I have skied most of Intrawest’s holdings and now reside at Mont Tremblant, Quebec. Interestingly, while reading this book Intrawest was purchased by The Aspen Skiing Company (was announced on April 10, 2017). That transaction added to the relevance of the content but already began to stale-date Chris’s book. That is how fast things change in the industry.
He tells some interesting stories about how dysfunctional Intrawest’s internal politics were. My interpretation based on observation and anecdotal stories is their real estate culture often clashed with ski purists. Regardless, Chris acknowledges that Intrawest was truly a real estate development company and that the ski areas were an “amenity” to lure travelers and second-home buyers.
In Chris’s analysis Whistler and Tremblant were “state of the art and effectively set the bar for base-area development in North America.” This is credited to creating brand-new villages at either’s base “without the issue of legacy buildings or uncooperative landlords.” Once again, he alludes to the conflict between the purists and “realtors”. Soon though, everyone was copying this model of development.
The story moves on to cover the “improvident” purchase of Intrawest by Fortress Investment Group. By the way, I had to look up the word “improvident”. It means careless, reckless, wasteful, rash or irresponsible. It certainly turned out that way but in 2006 no one predicted the massive recession except a few guys in the book and movie, The Big Short.
Fortress’ valuation was largely based on the real estate holdings once again contradicting Chris’ theory. The deal was done “using equity and a short-term bridge loan.” As soon as the loan came do Fortress had nowhere to go. Thus began the strategy of “repurposing” Intrawest assets. In other words, they sold stuff, ceased proper maintenance and investment, and generally appeared overwhelmed with what they bought.
This was evident at Tremblant. Walt Disney had a simple four point plan when he set up his resort destinations. He told his people, “No chipped paint. No stale popcorn. All the horses jump. No cracked windows.” The message being, everything works, everything looks good, everything delights. I often share this with clients and at conferences because it suggests never sacrificing the basics and never forgetting the differentiating flourishes.
There is a saying in the customer service business, “You have to learn to smile before you can run with a tray.” Well, Fortress appeared to trip from the start. Investment in Tremblant screeched to a halt. Then the worst happened. The overall asset was divided up. The commercial real estate assets became a standalone company, ski operations were constrained by newbie owners, individual businesses and restaurants were treated as secondary stakeholders, and liaisons with local government and tourism bureaus was strained.
In effect, it was ski-area-by-committee. A highly dysfunctional family resulted. Chris felt the same things viscerally at Steamboat. The Intrawest bought by Aspen Skiing Company is a shell of its former self. To me the reason why is clear, it is the historic and universal tension between ski purist and business.
The last few chapters were very interesting as Chris lays out how he sees the industry heading. He is bullish but for reasons I cannot agree. This starts with the claim that the “sport has never been more affordable”. Most enthusiasts would disagree. I expect Chris has not paid for a resort hot chocolate in over forty years if you get my drift.
I do agree that the sport is highly aspirational or as he says, “No one wears a GoPro when playing golf.” In that sense it is elitist. There are barriers to entry and cost is certainly a big one. What he fails to note is that when the economy tanked, mom and pop skis areas closed in record numbers and the big ski holding companies began pursuing a mass market.
This is where Tremblant made a wrong turn and is yet to recover. If you visit the area on a good weekend it is doing 10,000 to 12,000 skiers a day. Those are remarkable numbers for a resort of its size. Unfortunately, it impacts the product. I have never had to ski more defensively in my life. There is not a lot of beginner terrain but there are lots of beginners.
My family now buys the weekday pass to avoid the hordes. That may sound like the grousing of a local but it is a universal condemnation of Tremblant. Nor do the merchants or restaurateurs like the resulting demographic. All four seasons now the area is packed with day trippers who bring their own coolers and have a hard time walking ten feet to a garbage bin. Once again, that sounds snobby but it is not meant to be.
It is meant to herald a change to how Tremblant and other resorts market and run. It is a simple equation of less people paying more for the privilege. This will be more appealing to those who may buy surrounding real estate. It recognizes that more is not better for enjoyment, the environment or the sport.
I wrote on the subject of season’s passes and lift ticket pricing two years ago. As a result I got a call from Vail Ski Company to talk about pricing and brand perception. Dynamic pricing and the vast array of options was confusing not only skiers but ski area management. I joked that areas must be employing more accountants than lifties. My biggest bugaboo with pricing is ski areas start with the rack price and then they bastardize it a million ways to Sunday.
Very few skiers ever pay full price. It is a game that has to change. I have been encouraged by Tremblant’s start at pricing simplification. Next up is not doing so many specials or discounts because over the last few years ski areas have trained customers to wait for a deal. Sticking to a firm, decent margin, fair price will please both area and skier alike.
Chris points out that skiing is an innovation industry. This is evident in the equipment, snowmaking, grooming and lifts. He cannot believe in his years the reduction in sitting and waiting versus actually skiing. On that I agree. Where I deviate is when he applies this to rental shops and cafeterias. He thinks they are amazingly well run. Both are huge money makers yet remain quite archaic. Again, I don’t think Chris has waited in line for some number of years or paid $14 for a small bowl of chili.
What intrigued me most was his last chapter titled, A Better Resort Model: Stakeholder Buy-in. Chris has a vision for real ski towns not small, urban facilities or private club resorts. He talks about the emotional connection those who live in a ski town have for their area. So he suggests, “Wouldn’t it be better if everyone had some skin in the game with the ability to influence the strategic direction of the resort? Not for free. I’m talking investing…putting some money at risk in exchange for a seat at the table.”
This would be a percentage of ownership held by local businesses that are impacted by the performance of the ski area. He believes it should extend to individual locals. To me that is utopian and not realistic or pragmatic. Consultation may be a compromise but when it comes to running a ski area I believe you have to be a benevolent dictator.
Thanks to Chris for penning this and sharing his career. It was interesting and a catalyst for this overly long review!
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